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Naïve Theories About the Effects 
of Mood in Groups: A Preliminary 
Investigation
Janice R. Kelly and Jennifer R. Spoor
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We examined the content and consequences of people’s naïve theories about the effects of 
group mood. These theories are a potential input in Kelly and Spoor’s (2006) Input-
Process-Outcome model of group moods and performance. In Study 1, participants generated 
potential positive and negative consequences of group moods, which were coded using an 
adapted form of Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis (Bales, 1970). Participants believed that 
positive and negative moods have implications for both task and relationship processes, and 
these consequences varied according to group type (creativity, friendship, decision making, and 
sport team). In Study 2, participants watched an ostensible group interaction among friends 
or strangers who had just had positive or negative experiences. Perceptions of the interaction 
varied in a manner consistent with naïve theories about group moods and their effects. 
Implications for future research on group moods are discussed.
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The affective character of groups is readily 
apparent in the heated and emotional exchanges 
that occur during political discussions, the 
emotional reactions of sports teams (and their 
fans) to victories and losses, and the feelings of 
tension and hostility that some people experi-
ence during departmental meetings. Clearly, 
groups large and small have emotional states, 
and are affected by these states in ways that 
are distinct from the experiences of individual 
group members. It is likely that the impact of 
these affective states is partially shaped by group 
members’ prior beliefs and expectations. In 
particular, naïve theories about group mood may 
infl uence some aspects of a group’s interaction 
and performance. In this research, we explored 
whether people have naïve theories about group 
mood and whether such theories subsequently
affect perceptions of group interaction. In Study 1, 
we used a qualitative approach to examine the 
content and nature of naïve theories. In Study 2, 
we conducted an experiment to see whether and 
how naïve theories can bias perceptions of 
group interaction.
Emerging research and theory suggests that 
group affective states can influence group 
interaction and performance. These states have 
been defi ned in various ways, often stressing 
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elements of within-group agreement or the 
homogeneity of positive or negative affective 
experiences (George, 1996; Kelly & Barsade, 
2001; Kelly & Spoor, 2006). Thus, we defi ne 
group moods as relatively diffuse and generalized 
positive or negative affective states that are 
shared among group members. Other potentially 
important group affective states include group 
affective tone (George, 1989, 1995), defi ned as a 
group’s characteristic level of affect, and shared 
emotional states (Barsade & Gibson, 1998), which 
may result from strong group-related outcomes 
such as success or failure.
Given that research and theory on group af-
fective states is still in the early stages (Barsade & 
Gibson, 1998; Kelly, 2001; Kelly & Barsade, 
2001), many topics remain unexplored. However, 
drawing on the functional perspective toward 
groups (Hollingshead et al., 2005), Kelly and 
Spoor (2006) have recently suggested that an 
input-process-output (I-P-O) model may be use-
ful for analyzing the effects of group affective 
states. Kelly and Spoor argue that group 
affective states, such as group moods or group 
emotions, serve as input factors that subsequently 
affect group interaction processes and a 
group’s eventual output. Affective inputs could 
infl uence a variety of group processes, such 
as affect regulation, information processing, 
cooperation, and coordination. Important 
output consequences include affective states 
themselves, as well as performance outcomes. 
Although Kelly and Spoor’s model focuses on 
affective states as the primary input factors, 
other nonaffective factors may also serve as 
inputs to the group process (see also Kelly & 
Barsade, 2001). In this research, we explore 
one potentially important nonaffective input 
factor, namely group members’ naïve theories 
about group mood. 
Naïve theories as a source of 
information about mood effects 
in groups
Although we view group mood as a group-level 
phenomena, there is clearly a role for the 
experiences and beliefs of individual group 
members regarding group mood. Naïve theories, 
also referred to as lay, implicit, intuitive, or 
common sense theories (Heider, 1958; Hong, 
Levy, & Chiu, 2001; Wegener & Petty, 1998), 
refer to the organized knowledge and beliefs 
that people have regarding a particular target 
or situation (Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). As 
such, individuals’ naïve theories often guide 
their behavior within that situation (Dweck, 
Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Hong et al., 2001; Knee, 
Nanayakkara, Vietor, Neighbors, & Patrick, 
2001). Naïve theories have been explored in the 
domains of the self (Dweck et al., 1995; Wegner 
& Vallacher, 1977), leadership (Lord, Binning, 
Rush, & Thomas, 1978), relationships (Knee 
et al., 2001), and stereotypes (Levy, Plaks, Hong, 
Chiu, & Dweck, 2001; Yzerbt, Corneille, & 
Estrada, 2001).
With respect to group interaction and per-
formance, there is some evidence that naïve 
theories guide perceptions of group perform-
ance (Guzzo, Wagner, Maguire, Herr, & Hawley, 
1986; Martell & Guzzo, 1991; Staw, 1975). Several 
researchers have examined how performance 
information can bias group members’ recall of 
their group interaction and outside observers’ 
perceptions of groups. For example, Staw (1975) 
found that knowledge of a group’s performance 
outcome (success or failure) affected group mem-
bers’ later ratings of their actual interactions. 
In particular, participants who believed that 
their group performed well later reported that 
their group was more cohesive, experienced less 
confl ict, and was more cooperative. Importantly, 
the outcome feedback was randomly assigned 
after group interaction occurred, but before 
ratings of that interaction were made, suggesting 
that naïve theories about the causes of per-
formance biased group members’ memories of 
their interactions. Guzzo et al. (1986) later found 
that the impact of naïve theories depended on 
several situational factors. For example, group 
members were more likely to use naïve theories 
to explain their group’s performance when they 
received negative rather than positive outcome 
feedback. 
More recently, Martell and Guzzo (1991) exam-
ined whether knowledge of a group’s process or 
performance, relative to other groups, would 
affect evaluations of its performance. Participants 
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were shown a videotape of a group interaction 
and subsequently asked to provide evaluations of 
the group’s interaction and performance. Before 
making these evaluations, however, participants 
were given either positive or negative information 
about the group’s process or performance, 
ostensibly from a panel of experts. Participants’ 
own evaluations of the group’s interaction and 
performance were affected by this performance 
information, such that their ratings were biased 
in a direction consistent with the information 
they were given. In addition, participants were 
more likely to recall instances of effective be-
havior in positive process and performance 
conditions.
In a similar fashion, we believe that naïve 
theories about group mood may bias perceptions 
of a group’s performance and interactions, 
which could have important consequences for 
the group. For example, a supervisor may be less 
likely to seriously consider the recommenda-
tions of a group that he or she believes was in 
a negative mood if the supervisor believes that 
negative group moods have negative decision-
making consequences. And the naïve theories of 
actual group members may infl uence how they 
respond to their interactions (e.g. motivation 
to continue working, desire to remain in the 
group, satisfaction, etc.). It should be noted 
that naïve theories can produce important con-
sequences by guiding individuals’ behaviors and 
reactions within social situations, regardless of 
their accuracy or whether they are consciously 
used (Wegener & Petty, 1995). We also believe 
that naïve theories of both interacting group 
members and outside observers of the group 
can have important consequences, although 
from the perspective of the I-P-O model (Kelly 
and Spoor, 2006), we are primarily interested 
in whether naïve theories operate as potential 
input factors for an interacting group.
Naïve theories refl ect each person’s unique 
experiences, both direct and indirect (Anderson 
& Lindsay, 1998), and research suggests that 
these theories may develop at a relatively young 
age (Zelko, Duncan, Barden, Garber, & Masters, 
1986). Thus, people may develop naïve theories 
about group mood even if they have no personal 
experience with a particular group or group 
mood state. The prevalence of groups in the 
popular media and in politics, education, pro-
fessional sports, etc., suggests that even novices 
to group life have a rich database of indirect 
experience on which to draw. However, direct, 
personal experience is probably one of the 
strongest infl uences on the content of naïve 
theories about group mood. 
Group mood and group interaction
If naïve theories about group mood derive in 
part from past experiences in group settings, 
then a brief review of research and theory on 
group-level affect might provide some clues as 
to the content of people’s naïve theories about 
group mood. Only a handful of researchers 
have examined group mood (Kelly & Barsade, 
2001; Kelly & Spoor, 2006), and some have 
simply borrowed individual-level theories of 
moods and emotions to frame their research 
questions. At the individual level, a large body 
of research and theory has examined the 
relationship between affect and cognition (see 
Forgas, 1995, 2002 for reviews). For example, 
research from the affect priming (e.g. Bower, 
1981) and affect as information perspectives 
(Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001) suggests that 
mood states often bias judgments in a mood-
consistent manner, such that people in positive 
moods make more positive judgments, whereas 
people in negative moods make more negative 
judgments. Schwarz (1990) has also suggested, 
from an evolutionary perspective, that moods 
may provide information about the environment 
that subsequently affects levels of information 
processing. In particular, negative moods may 
signal the need for vigilance and thus induce 
systematic information processing, whereas 
positive moods may signal a benign situation 
and thus induce reliance on simple heuristics 
or cues.
Kelly (2001) has recently suggested that 
individual-level mood and information pro-
cessing theories may be extended to the group
level. For example, Forgas (1990) found that group 
discussion tends to accentuate biases associated 
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with positive moods and attenuate biases asso-
ciated with negative moods. Forgas attributed 
this asymmetry to more controlled (systematic) 
information processing among group members 
who are in negative moods, something often 
found with noninteracting individuals. More 
recently, Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, and Kerr (2000) 
also found information processing differences 
between groups in positive versus negative moods. 
Group members who were playing a chicken 
dilemma game and were in positive moods were 
more likely to rely on heuristics (e.g. imitating 
their partner) to guide their behavior. Group 
members who were in negative moods used more 
rational decision-making strategies, indicating 
more systematic information processing. Spoor 
and Kelly (2004) have suggested an evolution-
ary argument at the group level, in line with 
Schwarz’s (1990) reasoning at the individual 
level. They believe that negative group moods 
induce groups to engage in more systematic 
information processing, because such moods 
communicate problematic environments that 
need vigilant attention. Although one can de-
bate whether and when it is legitimate to apply 
individual-level theories to groups (Kerr, 
Neidermeier, & Kaplan, 2000), these and other 
studies certainly suggest that individual-level 
mood effects may also occur at the group level, 
at least with respect to information processing 
(Kelly, 2001). 
Group mood may also affect other, more 
uniquely group-level phenomena. For example, 
recent research suggests that positive group 
moods can improve group cohesion, leading to 
better cooperation and coordination (Craig & 
Kelly, 2000; Sanna, Parks, & Chang, 2003). 
This improved cooperation may in turn lead to 
better performance for groups in positive moods 
(Sabin & Gasper, 2002). Greater cohesion could 
also have negative consequences, however, such 
as distracting a group from concentrating on 
its task. Negative moods could have negative 
consequences as well, such as increasing dis-
agreements and tension, making it impossible 
to reach task goals.
Some of the effects of group mood that we have 
described refl ect relationship processes (e.g. 
cohesiveness, social tensions), whereas others 
refl ect more task-oriented processes (e.g. sys-
tematic information processing). This distinction 
has been a commonly observed aspect of group 
dynamics at least since the pioneering work of 
Bales and his Interaction Process Analysis system 
(IPA; Bales, 1950, 1970), and it has been refl ected 
in many theories about groups since that time 
(Bennis & Shepard, 1956; Smith & Berg, 1987; 
but see Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990, for a critique 
of this dichotomy). The IPA system (Bales, 1950, 
1970) includes 12 specifi c behavioral categories 
nested within 4 overarching process categories 
(see Table 1). Three categories describe positive 
socio-emotional activities (categories 1–3), three 
describe negative socio-emotional activities 
(categories 10–12), three describe active task 
activities (categories 4–6), and three describe 
passive task activities (categories 7–9). Although 
the IPA system (1950) was originally created for 
the act-by-act coding of behavior in interacting 
groups, the basic categories of Bales’ system 
could be adapted for coding written descriptions 
of group behavior and seem like a good match 
to important task and relationship behavior 
distinctions suggested by recent research and 
theory on mood in groups. Therefore, we 
chose to map people’s naïve theories about 
mood in groups onto this positive and negative 
socio-emotional versus active and passive task 
distinction.
Table 1. Bales’ (1970) interaction process analysis 
categories 
General categories Specifi c categories
Positive socio-emotional (1) Shows solidarity/
seems friendly
  (2) Shows tension 
release/dramatizes
  (3) Agrees 
Active task  (4) Gives suggestion
  (5) Gives opinion
  (6) Gives orientation
Passive task  (7) Asks for orientation
  (8) Asks for opinion
  (9) Asks for suggestion
Negative socio-emotional (10) Disagrees
 (11) Shows tension
 (12) Shows antagonism/
seems unfriendly
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Group type as a moderator
Kelly and Spoor’s (2006) I-P-O model also 
suggests that group-level affective states seldom 
have uniformly positive or negative effects on 
group process or performance. In discussing 
the concept of process-performance fi t (Hutson-
Comeaux & Kelly, 1996; Wood, 1987), Kelly and 
Spoor noted that process and performance 
outcomes are likely to be moderated by group 
type. That is, the effects of changes in a group’s 
interaction process probably depend on the 
particular demands of its task. Thus, we were 
also interested in whether naïve theories about 
group mood would vary across different types 
of groups.
In line with Bales (1950; see also Wood, 1987), 
the effects of group mood on group interaction 
and performance may depend on whether a 
group is relatively task-oriented or relationship-
oriented. For example, the potential risks of 
negative moods, such as less systematic infor-
mation processing, may be more important 
for task-oriented groups (e.g. decision making, 
problem solving, or creativity groups). And the 
potential benefi ts of positive moods, such as 
increases in cohesion or cooperation, may be 
more important for relationship-oriented groups 
(e.g. friendship cliques, sports teams), which 
require better relations among members. Thus, 
we examined naïve theories in terms of groups 
that are primarily task- (e.g. decision making 
groups, sport teams) versus relational-oriented 
(e.g. friendship groups, creativity groups), 
although we acknowledge that most groups 
combine aspects of both task and relational 
orientations.
Summary and overview of studies
In Study 1, we used a qualitative approach to ex-
plore the content of naïve theories about group 
moods. Participants reported their beliefs about 
how positive and negative moods would affect 
group interaction in creativity groups, friendship 
groups, decision-making groups, and sports 
teams. Their responses were then coded into an 
adapted form of Bales’ (1950, 1970) IPA system. 
Although we did not have specifi c predictions 
about all effects, we did predict, based on our 
recent conceptual model (Kelly & Spoor, 2006), 
that the content of naïve theories would be 
moderated by mood and group type. In Study 2, 
we showed participants a videotape of a group 
interaction and manipulated whether they 
believed that the group contained friends 
or strangers who were in positive or negative 
moods. We then examined whether simply know-
ing about a group’s mood affects interpretation 
of the interaction among group members in 
terms of the IPA dimensions.
Study 1
Method
Pretest We fi rst conducted a pretest to assess our 
participants’ familiarity with each of the group 
types assessed in Study 1. We were also interested 
in providing evidence for the distinction be-
tween task- and relationship-orientation within 
each of type of group. Seventeen introductory 
psychology students (9 males, 8 females, 
mean age = 19.29) rated their familiarity with 
examples from each of the four group types. 
For example, participants were asked to think 
about a creative advertising team as an example 
of a creativity group, and a selection committee 
choosing the best job candidate as an example 
of a decision-making group. For each type of 
group, participants also reported on its task- or 
relationship-orientation. 
Three items assessed participants’ familiar-
ity with each type of group. Using 7-point scales, 
ranging from 1 to 7, participants rated how 
easily they could imagine themselves in such 
groups, how much experience they had with 
such groups, and the number of times they had 
been in such groups. Cronbach alphas for each 
of the four group types was good (αcreate = .84, 
αfriend = .89, αdecide = .82, αsport = .80), so responses 
to the three items were simply averaged by 
group type to produce overall scores. Larger 
scores indicated more familiarity with a particu-
lar type of group.
Participants also rated, using 7-point scales that 
ranged from 1 to 7, the extent to which each 
type of group was ‘task-oriented’ and ‘relationship-
oriented’. These items were not signifi cantly 
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correlated for any of the group types (rcreate = –.01, 
rfriend = .10, rdecide = –.20, rsport = .10, all ps > .44), so 
responses to them were analyzed separately.
Preliminary analyses did not reveal any 
signifi cant main effects or interactions with 
participant gender, and so subsequent analy-
ses were collapsed across this factor. All three 
measures (familiarity scores, ‘task orientation’ 
ratings, and ‘relationship orientation’ ratings 
were each submitted to a repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with group 
type treated as the within-subjects factor. Post 
hoc analyses used Bonferroni’s correction for 
multiple comparisons.
The pretest means for each measure are sum-
marized in Table 2. Participants were at least 
moderately familiar with each of the four group 
types, as all means were above the midpoint of the 
scale. Familiarity ratings differed signifi cantly 
across group types (F(3, 48) = 13.51, p < .0001). 
Post hoc analyses indicated that familiarity ratings 
for sports teams did not differ from familiarity 
ratings for friendships groups, but these ratings 
both were signifi cantly higher than familiarity 
ratings for creativity and decision making groups, 
which did not differ from each other.
Participants’ ‘task orientation’ ratings also dif-
fered signifi cantly across group types (F (3, 48) = 
26.18, p < .0001). Post hoc analyses indicated 
that friendship groups were rated as signifi cantly 
lower in task orientation than the other three 
types of groups. Among the other group types, 
sports groups were rated signifi cantly higher in 
task orientation than creativity groups.
Finally, participants’ ‘relationship orientation’ 
ratings differed signifi cantly across group types 
as well (F (3, 48) = 25.19, p < .0001). Post hoc 
analyses indicated that decision-making groups 
were rated as signifi cantly lower in relationship 
orientation than the other three types of groups. 
Among the other group types, friendship groups 
were rated signifi cantly higher in relationship 
orientation than creativity groups.
In sum, participants indicated that they were 
somewhat familiar with all groups, though most 
familiar with friendship groups and sport teams. 
And friendship groups were rated as lowest in task 
orientation, whereas decision-making groups were 
rated as lowest in relationship orientation.
Participants Participants in the actual study 
were 54 introductory psychology students 
(15 females and 39 males) whose partici-
pation helped them meet a course requirement. 
The participants were primarily European 
American (78%), and ranged in age from 18 
to 24 (M = 19.7).
Procedure Participants were recruited for a 
study on the ‘perception of groups’. They were 
asked to complete a two-part questionnaire. 
First, we presented participants with an example 
for each type of group (creativity, friendship, 
decision making, sports team).These were the 
same examples used in the pretest. Participants 
were then asked to imagine that each group was 
in (a) a positive mood, and (b) a negative mood, 
and to describe all of the possible positive or 
Table 2. Pretest means and (standard deviations) for familiarity, task orientation, and relationship orientation 
ratings of four group types
   Relationship
Group type Familiarity Task orientation orientation
Creativity 4.28a (1.31)  5.47a (1.01)  4.65ad (1.27)
 Decision making 4.86a (1.48) 6.00ac (1.41) 3.06b (1.35)
 Friends 6.26b (0.84) 3.29b (1.21) 6.41c (0.80)
 Sports 6.31b (1.04) 6.18c (0.64) 5.71cd (0.92)
Notes: Higher means indicate greater familiarity, task orientation, and relationship orientation. Means in the 
same column that do not share subscripts are signifi cantly different, using Bonferroni’s adjustment for multiple 
comparisons.
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negative consequences of each of these moods. 
All participants thus described the positive 
effects of positive moods, the negative effects of 
positive moods, the positive effects of negative 
moods, and the negative effects of negative 
moods for creativity groups, friendship groups, 
decision making groups, and sport teams, always 
in that order.
Second, participants were asked to rate the 
ideal group mood for each of the four types of 
groups on a 7-point scale ranging from negative 
(–3) to positive (3). Based on their personal 
knowledge and experience, what did they believe 
the best mood would be for a creativity group, 
a friendship group, a decision-making group, 
and a sports team?
When participants completed the question-
naire, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
During their debriefi ng, none of the participants 
could guess our research hypothesis.
Coding of open-ended responses Participants’ 
open-ended responses were coded using an 
adapted form of Bales’ IPA system (Bales, 1970). 
We combined several categories that were con-
ceptually related, but were not expected to be 
used very often. Categories 1 and 2 were com-
bined into a positive socio-emotional category, 
categories 4, 5, and 6 were combined into an 
active task category, categories 7, 8, and 9 were 
combined into a passive task category, and 
categories 11 and 12 were combined into a 
negative socio-emotional category. Ridgeway and 
Johnson (1990) have argued that agreements 
and disagreements are not exclusively socio-
emotional categories, but rather serve important 
task functions, because they can fi nalize discus-
sion on a topic and thus move the group for-
ward. Consistent with their argument, and to 
create more pure socio-emotional categories, 
we kept category 3 (agreements) separate 
from the other two positive socio-emotional 
categories as agreements, and we kept category 
10 (disagreements) separate from the other two 
negative socio-emotional categories. 
Two female undergraduate coders, who 
were unaware of the hypotheses of the study, 
were trained in the meaning of the original 12 
categories. We described for them the types of 
statements that would be coded within each of 
those categories. We also generated and coded 
for them statements regarding the effects of 
various group moods on group performance. 
After training, a subset of fi ve questionnaires 
(containing more than 190 statements of 
consequences) was randomly selected from the 
full sample. Both coders independently coded 
every statement on those questionnaires, with a 
71% agreement rate. Cohen’s kappa, which cor-
rects for chance agreement, was fair (kappa = .56, 
p < .0001). Bakeman, Quera, McArthur, and 
Robinson (1996) have shown that even when 
coders are reliable and accurate, a kappa coeffi -
cient may be low if there is wide variability in 
the a priori probabilities for each category. Dis-
agreements between the coders were discussed 
and resolved by coder consensus. Each coder 
then independently coded approximately half 
of the remaining questionnaires.
Results
First, we present analyses of the frequencies 
(for each group type) of statements involving 
different IPA category and mood effect combin-
ations, as well as examples of typical responses. 
Second, we present the ratings of ‘ideal mood’ 
for each type of group.
Frequency analyses Participants listed an 
average of 1.66 consequences for each of the 
16 combinations of group type and mood 
effect, indicating that they were able to think 
of such consequences. To examine whether 
participants generated a different number of 
consequences across the group type/mood 
effect combinations, we conducted a 4 (Group 
Type) × 4 (Mood Effect) multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA). The main effect for 
Mood Effect was signifi cant (F(3, 51) = 19.78, 
p < .0001). Participants listed an equal number 
of positive consequences of positive mood 
and negative consequences of negative mood 
(Ms = 2.00) (ns). They listed significantly 
fewer negative consequences of positive mood 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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(M = 1.40) and positive consequences of nega-
tive moods (M = 1.23), although these did not 
differ from each other (ns). The main effect for 
Group Type was also signifi cant (F (3, 51) = 11.07, 
p < .0001). Participants listed more consequences 
for creativity groups (M = 1.92) than for any 
other type of group (ps < .03). And they listed 
signifi cantly more consequences for friend-
ship cliques (M = 1.67) than for decision-making 
groups (M = 1.44) (p = 032); the mean for 
sports teams fell in between (M=1.60) (ns). The 
interaction was not signifi cant (F(9, 45) = 1.65, 
p > .12). The only times when participants had 
any diffi culty generating consequences (i.e. 
greater than 15% of the sample could not gener-
ate any consequences) was when they tried to 
describe positive effects of negative moods in 
friendship groups and negative effects of positive 
moods in friendship groups.
Category frequencies for each of the 16 com-
binations of Group Type and Mood Effect were 
standardized by dividing those frequencies by 
the total number of effects generated for that 
group type. Because of the large number of cells, 
marginal means for group type and for mood 
effect are summarized in Table 3.
A MANOVA was conducted on these pro-
portions.1 The four levels of Group Type, the 
four levels of Mood Effect, and the six levels of 
the Bales’ Categories were included as within-
subjects factors. This analysis yielded signifi cant 
multivariate effects for Group Type (F(3, 51) = 
5.99, p < .001), Mood Effect (F(3, 51) = 15.05, 
p < .0001), and Bales Category (F(5, 49) = 395.67, 
p < .0001). However, all of the main effects were 
qualifi ed by signifi cant 2-way and 3-way inter-
actions. The Group Type × Mood Effect interaction 
was signifi cant (F (8, 36) = 3.17, p < .006), as were 
the Group Type × Bales Category interaction 
(F (15, 39) = 14.27, p < .0001), and the Mood 
Effect × Bales Category interaction (F (15, 39) = 
453.05, p < .0001). Finally, the Group Type × 
Mood Effect × Bales Category interaction was 
also significant (F(45, 9) = 4.98, p < .007). 
Given that all of the multivariate effects were 
signifi cant, separate follow-up ANOVAs were 
conducted on each group type, treating Bales 
category and mood effect as within-subjects 
factors. Means for these analyses and post hoc 
comparisons among the means are presented in 
Table 4. All post hoc analyses used Bonferroni’s 
correction for multiple comparisons. To enrich 
the results from these analyses, we also present 
specifi c examples of consequences described 
by the participants.
Creativity groups In general, creativity groups 
were thought to benefi t from positive moods, 
especially with respect to positive socio-emotional 
and active task consequences. For example, pos-
itive moods were thought to lead group members 
to ‘be more responsive to each other and more 
Table 3. Proportion of consequences generated for each Group Type and Mood Effect category
 Pos socio-  Active  Passive   Neg socio-
 emotional Agree task task Disagree emotional
Group Type     
 Creativity 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.01 0.17 0.31
 Friendship 0.30 0.03 0.11 0.002 0.11 0.29
 Decision-making 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.02 0.24 0.26
 Sport team 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.006 0.13 0.37
Mood Effect     
 Pos mood/ pos effects 0.49 0.20 0.28 0.02 0.003 0.01
 Pos mood/ neg effects 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.47
 Neg mood/ pos effects 0.13 0.18 0.33 0.02 0.04 0.11
 Neg mood/ neg effects 0.002 0.02 0.006 0.00 0.35 0.62
Note: Cell values represent the proportion of times a particular type of consequence was mentioned. Proportions 
were obtained for each participant by dividing each category frequency by the total number of effects generated 
for that group type. 
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patient’, as well as to be ‘more responsive to sug-
gestions and ideas of others’. Negative moods 
were thought to produce mostly negative conse-
quences, especially by increasing disagree-
ments and negative interpersonal behavior. For 
example, negative moods were thought to lead 
group members to be ‘overly critical of ideas 
and proposals’, as well as making them ‘more 
likely to bite each others’ heads off’.
The univariate ANOVA revealed a signifi cant 
main effect for Mood Effect (F(3, 795) = 53.88, 
p < .0001). Positive consequences of positive 
moods and negative consequences of negative 
moods were described most often, whereas 
negative consequences of positive moods and 
positive consequences of negative moods were 
described less often. The main effect of Bales 
category was also signifi cant (F(5, 795) = 5.30, 
p < .001). Negative socio-emotional consequences 
were described most often and passive task con-
sequences were described least often. These main 
effects, however, were qualifi ed by a signifi cant 
Mood Effect × Bales Category interaction (F(15, 
795) = 32.77, p < .0001). As Table 4 shows, par-
ticipants thought that the positive effects of 
positive moods would be primarily in terms of 
active task and positive socio-emotional con-
sequences. Participants also listed agreement 
consequences more frequently than either 
negative socio-emotional or disagreement con-
sequences. For positive effects of negative moods, 
however, participants listed primarily active task 
contributions and agreements, whereas the other 
categories were listed less frequently. For both 
positive and negative moods, participants listed 
the greatest number of negative effects in terms 
of disagreements and negative socio-emotional 
consequences, and other consequences were 
listed with lower frequency.
Friendship groups Descriptions of how mood 
affects friendship groups differed from de-
scriptions of the other three group types in that 
participants had trouble thinking of negative 
effects of positive moods or positive effects of 
negative moods. Positive moods were thought 
to produce mostly positive consequences—
friendship groups experiencing such moods 
would ‘feel at ease interacting’, leading to a 
‘joking atmosphere’ and ‘everyone having a 
good time’. Negative moods were thought to 
produce mostly negative consequences. For ex-
ample, ‘friendships would likely begin to strain 
as arguments would probably start breaking 
out’ and members would make ‘cruel comments’ 
to one another.
There was a signifi cant main effect of Mood 
Effect (F(3, 795) = 17.56, p < .0001). Positive 
effects of positive moods and negative effects 
of negative moods were described more often 
than negative effects of positive moods or posi-
tive effects of negative moods. The main effect 
for Bales Category was also signifi cant (F(5, 795) 
= 53.59, p < .0001). As Table 4 shows, most of the 
consequences that participants described in-
volved the positive socio-emotional and negative 
socio-emotional categories. However, a signifi -
cant Mood Effect × Bales Category interaction 
again occurred (F (15, 795) = 59.08, p < .0001). 
As seen in Table 4, participants thought that 
the positive effects of positive moods would be 
primarily in terms of agreements; they rarely 
listed examples of the other categories. In con-
trast, the negative effects of positive moods were 
thought to be primarily in terms of negative 
socio-emotional consequences. The next most 
frequently listed categories were disagreements 
and positive socio-emotional consequences. 
Participants thought that the positive effects of 
negative mood would be primarily in terms of 
active task contributions, followed by positive 
socio-emotional consequences. In contrast, the 
negative effects of negative mood were thought to 
be primarily in terms of negative socio-emotional 
consequences, followed by disagreements. 
Decision making groups Decision making groups 
were also described somewhat differently than 
the other groups, in that participants tended 
to describe positive and negative consequences 
for positive and negative moods more evenly. 
For example, positive moods were thought to 
help group members ‘get along and be more 
willing to cooperate’, but also to make them 
‘less likely to have the appropriate seriousness 
for dealing with such an important decision’. 
Similarly, negative moods were thought to make 
group members ‘more likely to ignore or reject 
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teammates ideas and opinions’, but also to help 
them ‘stay suffi ciently serious when making the 
decision’.
 There was a signifi cant main effect for Mood 
Effect (F(3, 795) = 5.08, p < .001). Participants 
were slightly more likely to describe positive 
effects of positive moods and negative effects of 
negative moods than negative effects of positive 
moods and positive effects of negative moods. 
A signifi cant main effect was also found for 
Bales Category (F(5, 795) = 21.25, p < .0001). 
More effects were described for the agree, active 
task, disagree, and negative socio-emotional 
categories than for the positive socio-emotional 
and passive task categories. However, there was 
again a signifi cant Mood Effect × Bales Category 
interaction (F(15, 795) = 16.70, p < .0001). As 
Table 4 shows, participants thought that the 
positive effects of positive moods would be 
primarily in terms of active task contributions 
and agreements; the other categories were 
listed signifi cantly less often. In contrast, the 
negative effects of positive moods were primarily 
in terms of disagreements, followed by negative 
socio-emotional and agreement consequences. 
Participants thought that the positive effects of 
negative moods would be primarily in terms of 
active task consequences, followed by agreement 
and negative socio-emotional consequences, 
whereas disagreements and negative socio-
emotional consequences were listed most 
frequently as the negative effects of negative 
moods. 
Sport teams Descriptions of how mood affects 
sport teams tended to focus on issues of confi -
dence, focus, and the ability to work together. 
Positive moods were thought to make group 
‘members more likely to be optimistic in the face 
of losing or setbacks’, and to allow them ‘to work 
together well and maintain the collective good 
mood’. But positive moods were also thought 
to make group members ‘too self-confi dent’ 
and to ‘not be serious enough to stay focused 
on the game’. Negative moods were thought 
to help group members ‘stay more focused on 
the game’, but also to make them ‘much more 
likely to just give up and accept defeat’.
There was a signifi cant main effect for Mood 
Effect (F(3, 795) = 4.02, p < .002). As with 
friendship groups, participants were more likely 
to describe positive effects for positive mood 
and negative effects for negative moods. A sig-
nifi cant Bales Category main effect (F(5, 795) 
= 42.05, p < .0001) was also found. Participants 
described many positive and negative socio-
emotional effects, but few passive task effects. 
And again there was a signifi cant Mood Effect × 
Bales Category interaction (F(15, 795) = 32.00, 
p < .0001). As seen in Table 4, participants 
thought that the positive effects of positive 
moods would be primarily in terms of positive 
socio-emotional consequences. Agreement and 
active task consequences were the next most 
frequent categories; the remaining categories 
were almost never listed. Participants thought 
that the negative effects of positive moods 
would be in terms of negative socio-emotional 
consequences. Disagreements were the next 
most frequent category, followed by positive 
socio-emotional and active task consequences. 
The positive effects of negative moods were more 
equally spread across the six Bales categories, 
although active task and positive socio-emotional 
consequences were listed most often. Negative 
socio-emotional and agreement consequences 
were also listed frequently. As for the negative 
effects of negative moods, the primary effect 
was in terms of negative socio-emotional 
consequences. Disagreements were listed 
less frequently than negative socio-emotional 
consequences, but more frequently than the 
remaining four categories. 
 
Ideal group mood A 2 (Gender) × 4 (Group Type) 
ANOVA was conducted on participants’ rating 
of ideal group moods, with Group Type treated 
as a within-subjects factor. The main effect for 
Group Type was signifi cant (F(3, 156) = 23.19, 
p < .0001). In general, participants rated the 
ideal group mood as somewhat positive. How-
ever, friendship groups required the most positive 
mood (M = 2.05) (ps < .001), whereas decision 
making groups required the most neutral mood 
(M = .55) (ps < .0001). The mean ideal mood 
for creativity groups (M = 1.38) and sport teams 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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(M = 1.50) fell inbetween and were not signifi -
cantly different from each other (p > .90).
This effect was qualified by a significant 
Gender × Group Type interaction (F(3, 152) = 3.84, 
p < .02). Post hoc analyses, adjusted using the 
Bonferroni correction, indicated that women’s 
ratings of the ideal group mood for the four group 
types were all relatively positive (Mdecision = .87, 
Msport = 1.33, Mcreative = 1.40, Mfriend = 1.80) and not 
signifi cantly different (ps > .43). In contrast, 
men rated the ideal mood for decision making 
groups as signifi cantly more neutral (M = .23) 
than the ideal moods for the other three group 
types (ps < .0001). Men also rated the ideal mood 
for friendship groups as significantly more 
positive (M = 2.31) than the ideal moods for the 
other three group types (ps < .0001). The ideal 
moods for creativity groups and sports groups 
(Ms = 1.36 and 1.67, respectively) did not differ 
signifi cantly (p > .70). 
Study 2
Study 1 examined the content of naïve theories 
about the effects of group mood. We found evi-
dence that people have varying beliefs about 
how a group’s mood will affect the quality of 
member interactions. These effects were both 
positive and negative and varied across differ-
ent types of groups. Although the results of 
Study 1 provide some insights into how people 
think about mood in groups, they did not 
reveal whether these beliefs actually infl uence 
perceptions of a group or the actual behavior 
of group members. We conducted Study 2 to 
explore the fi rst of these issues. 
Participants watched a videotaped interaction 
of a decision-making group and then completed 
questionnaire measures based on the Bales’ (1970) 
IPA categories. Participants were told that the 
group’s mood was either positive or negative. We 
also manipulated whether participants believed 
that the group consisted of friends or strangers. 
We assumed that the stranger condition would 
correspond to the decision-making groups in 
Study 1, given that no information was provided 
to participants in that study about the relation-
ships among group members. Therefore, we 
predicted that Bales’ responses for the stranger 
condition would vary as a function of mood in a 
manner similar to the responses shown for 
decision-making groups in Table 4. In contrast, 
we expected responses for the friends condition 
to show a pattern similar to the one for friend-
ship groups in Table 4. To be more specifi c, we 
expected positive mood to strongly infl uence 
the degree to which participants perceived posi-
tive socio-emotional responses in the friends 
condition, but to affect perceptions of positive 
socio-emotional responses in the stranger 
condition more moderately. Responses involving 
active task consequences, in contrast, were 
expected to be more prevalent in the positive 
mood condition for strangers, but more prevalent 
in the negative mood condition for friends. 
Passive task consequences showed no differences 
for either mood effect or group type in Study 1, 
so we did not expect such effects in Study 2. 
Finally, negative socio-emotional responses were 
expected to be more prevalent in the negative 
mood condition for both types of group. 
Method
Participants Participants were 94 introductory 
psychology students (57 male, 37 female) who 
received partial course credit toward a course 
requirement for participating. Participants were 
primarily European American (77%) and ranged 
in age from 18 to 31 (M = 19.84, SD = 2.03).
Procedure Participants were told that the study 
involved perceptions of small groups and that 
they would watch a videotaped interaction (from 
an earlier experiment) of a group working on 
a task. In the friends conditions, participants 
were told that the group consisted of friends 
who had signed up to participate together. In 
the strangers conditions, participants were told 
that the group consisted of strangers who did 
not know each other before the experiment. In 
the positive mood conditions, participants were 
told that just before its interaction was taped, the 
group had watched and rated funny fi lm clips. 
In the negative mood conditions, participants 
were told that the group had watched and 
rated sad fi lm clips just before its interaction 
was taped. Participants were given examples 
of well-known funny and sad fi lms so that they 
had a better sense of what moods the groups 
were experiencing. 
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All participants then watched a nine-minute 
videotape of a group interaction developed by 
Carlston and Spoor (2004) for an unrelated 
study on perceptions of opinion minorities. 
The tape showed four undergraduate research 
assistants (three males, one female) discussing a 
fi ctitious civil case in which a lumber company 
was suing an airline for damages (Kruglanski, 
Webster, & Klem, 1993). Three group members 
favored one side of the case, but one group mem-
ber disagreed, so the group could not reach a 
consensus. Carlston and Spoor instructed their 
research assistants to disagree, but to also remain 
polite and sociable throughout their group 
interaction. Group members said nothing 
explicit about their affective states during the 
interaction.
After watching the videotape, participants 
completed a short questionnaire assessing 
their perceptions of the interaction, including 
manipulation checks and perceptions of the 
Bales’ (1970) IPA categories. The latter measures 
involved questions about prototypical examples 
of the four major IPA categories (positive socio-
emotional, active task, passive task, and negative 
socio-emotional). Participants indicated the 
extent to which each behavior occurred in the 
group using 11-point scales ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 11 (extremely). Given the nature of 
the group discussion (one group member al-
ways disagreed and the other three members 
always agreed), we did not assess the ‘agrees’ 
or ‘disagrees’ subcategories separately.
Participants were then thanked, debriefed, 
and dismissed. During debriefi ng, none of the 
participants expressed doubts about the reality 
of the group. About 20% of the participants 
thought that the group’s affective state or com-
position might have affected its interaction. How-
ever, none of the participants thought that this 
information affected their judgments about 
the group.
Results
All measures were submitted to a 2 (positive or 
negative group mood) × 2 (friends or strangers) 
between-subjects ANOVA.
Manipulation Checks Two items served as 
a manipulation check for perceptions of the 
group’s mood. Participants were asked, ‘What 
was the group’s emotional tone?’ and ‘What was 
the group’s mood?’ Responses were made on 
11-point scales ranging from 1 (negative) to 11 
(positive). Responses to the two items were highly 
correlated (r = .78), so they were averaged to 
create a scale measuring the perceived mood of 
the group. Analysis of this scale yielded only a 
signifi cant main effect for Group Mood (F (1, 
90) = 3.97, p < .05). Participants who were told 
that the group had watched funny fi lms rated 
the group’s mood as more positive (M = 5.38) 
than did participants who were told that the 
group had watched sad fi lms (M = 4.60). Al-
though participants rated the group’s mood 
as neutral (and even slightly negative) in both 
conditions, the manipulation did seem to affect 
their perceptions in the intended direction. 
Again, the fact that the group was discussing 
a civil trial, and that one group member dis-
sented from the majority, may explain why the 
group’s mood was not rated as more positive 
or negative.
Two items served as a manipulation check for 
group type. Participants were asked, ‘How well 
did the group members know each other?’ and 
‘How “close” did the group members seem to be?’ 
Responses were given on 11-point scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to11 (extremely). Responses to 
the items were highly correlated (r = .75), so they 
were averaged to create a scale measuring per-
ceived group type. Analysis of this scale yielded 
only a signifi cant main effect for Group Type 
(F(1, 90) = 22.55, p < .0001). Participants who 
were told that the group consisted of friends 
rated the group as more close (M = 4.88) than 
did participants who were told that the group 
consisted of strangers (M = 2.92). Although 
neither group was perceived as particularly close, 
our manipulation did seem to affect participants’ 
perceptions of group members’ relationships in 
the intended direction.
Perceptions of Bales’ IPA categories Responses 
on the Bales’ category scales as a function of 
mood and group type are summarized in 
Table 5. Within and across conditions, t tests 
revealed that participants perceived that active 
task behaviors (e.g. providing suggestions) 
and negative socio-emotional behaviors 
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(e.g. rejecting each others’ ideas) occurred more 
frequently than the scale midpoint (ps < .001), 
whereas passive task behaviors (e.g. asking for 
suggestions) occurred less frequently than the 
scale midpoint (ps < .0001). In contrast, positive 
socio-emotional behaviors (e.g. being responsive 
to others’ ideas) occurred at levels that did not 
differ from the scale midpoints (p > .49). Across 
conditions, responses to the measures were only 
modestly correlated (rs ranged from –.36 to .41), 
so we analyzed each behavior separately.
Positive socio-emotional To assess positive socio-
emotional behavior in the group, participants 
were asked, ‘To what extent did the group mem-
bers demonstrate acceptance and openness to 
the ideas of others?’ We expected only a small 
difference in favor of positive mood in the stran-
gers condition, but a larger difference in favor of 
positive mood in the friends condition. Although 
the mean responses showed this pattern, there 
were no signifi cant main effects or interactions 
in the analysis.
Active task To assess active task behavior in the 
group, participants were asked, ‘To what extent 
did the group members offer facts, opinions 
and other relevant information to help the 
group achieve its goal?’ We expected that active 
task behavior would seem more prevalent in 
the positive mood condition for strangers, but 
more prevalent in the negative mood condition 
for friends. The analysis yielded a marginal 
main effect for Group Type (F(1, 90) = 3.21, 
p < .08). Friends (M = 8.39) seemed to exhibit 
more active task behavior than strangers (M = 
7.64). But consistent with our predictions, this 
main effect was qualifi ed by a signifi cant Group 
Mood × Group Type interaction (F (1, 90) = 4.24, 
p < .05). As shown in Table 5, active task behavior 
was seen as more prevalent in the negative 
mood/friends condition, and least prevalent in 
the positive mood/strangers condition. 
Passive task To assess passive task behavior in the 
group, participants were asked, ‘To what extent 
did the group members request information 
from other members?’ Passive task behavior 
was not expected to vary as a function of our 
manipulations, and in fact the analysis yielded 
only a marginally signifi cant effect for Group 
Type (F(1, 90) = 3.60, p < .07). Although the 
means were relatively low across conditions, 
participants perceived that friends exhibited 
somewhat more passive task behavior (M = 4.01) 
than strangers (M = 3.10). 
Negative socio-emotional To assess negative socio-
emotional behavior in the group, participants 
were asked, ‘To what extent did group mem-
bers reject the ideas of others?’ Negative socio-
emotional behavior was expected to be more 
prevalent in the negative mood condition for 
both group types. Consistent with that prediction, 
that analysis showed only a signifi cant main 
effect for Group Mood (F(1, 90) = 5.48, p < .03). 
Negative mood groups seemed to exhibit more 
negative socio-emotional behavior (M = 8.95) 
than did positive mood groups (M = 8.01). 
Relations among measures Although perceptions 
of the four behaviors were only moderately 
correlated, we briefl y describe the pattern of 
correlations within experimental conditions. 
In all conditions, responses to the negative and 
positive socio-emotional items were negatively 
correlated. This correlation was weakest and 
nonsignifi cant in the positive mood/strangers 
Table 5. Study 2: Mean ratings of group interactions
 Positive Active Passive Negative
Group and mood socio-emotional task  task socio-emotional
Friends/positive mood 6.12a 7.96ab 4.31a 7.58a
Friends/negative mood 5.67a 8.81a 3.71ab 8.81b
Strangers/positive mood 6.00a 8.07ab 3.30ab 8.44ab
Strangers/negative mood 5.40a 7.20b 2.90b 9.10b
Note: Means in the same column that do not share subscripts are signifi cantly different.
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condition (r = –.20) and strongest in the negative 
mood/strangers condition (r = –.64). Responses 
to the negative socio-emotional and active task 
items were not signifi cantly correlated in any 
of the conditions. Responses to the negative 
socio-emotional and passive task items were 
signifi cantly correlated only in the negative 
mood/friends condition (r = –.45).
Responses to the positive socio-emotional 
and active task items were not signifi cantly 
correlated in any of the conditions. Responses 
to the positive socio-emotional and passive task 
items were signifi cantly and positively correlated 
in the positive mood/friends and the negative 
mood/friends conditions (rs = .52 and.47, re-
spectively). Responses to the active and passive 
task items were not signifi cantly correlated in 
any of the conditions.
General discussion
In line with Kelly and Spoor’s (2006) I-P-O 
model of group moods and performance, we 
were interested in the potential role of naïve 
theories about group mood as an input factor 
that has the potential to infl uence group pro-
cesses and performance. Across two studies, 
using very different methods, we examined 
the content and effects of naïve theories about 
group mood. Using qualitative procedures 
in Study 1, we found that participants’ naïve 
theories included content about both task and 
interpersonal aspects of group interaction. 
Study 2, which used quantitative procedures, 
showed that naïve theories about group mood 
biased observers’ perceptions of a group’s 
interaction.
The results of Study 1 indicate that naïve 
theories about group mood might lead people 
to believe that positive moods will lead to positive 
interpersonal consequences, such as increased 
agreement and better communication among 
group members, all of which could strengthen 
group cohesion. However, participants in Study 1 
also felt that positive moods could distract group 
members from their task and reduce careful 
information processing. Negative group moods 
were expected to produce negative interpersonal 
consequences, increased disagreement, and 
reduced effort. This effect was also evident in 
the perceptions of Study 2 participants, who 
perceived more negative interactions in nega-
tive mood groups. However, participants in 
Study 1 also believed that negative moods could 
produce greater attention to detail, and in some 
cases, improved communication. These beliefs 
were also refl ected in the perceptions of Study 2 
participants, who saw more active task contri-
butions among friends in negative moods.
In both studies, we also found that the effects 
of group mood depended on the type of group 
that was considered. In Study 1, we examined 
groups that varied in whether they were more 
relationship-oriented (sports teams and friend-
ship groups) or task-oriented (decision making 
and creativity). For relationship-oriented groups, 
the expected effects of group mood were 
primarily in the positive and negative socio-
emotional categories of behavior. In contrast, 
most of the effects for task-oriented groups 
were in the active and passive task categories of 
behavior. In particular, participants acknowledged 
that negative moods might sometimes have 
positive effects, such as increasing task-oriented 
contributions. In Study 2, we only examined per-
ceptions of a task-oriented group. The strangers 
condition in Study 2 was most similar to the 
decision-making groups of Study 1, whereas the 
friends condition in Study 2 was most similar to 
the friendship groups in Study 1. In line with 
the naïve theories about mood effects in 
decision-making groups that we found in Study 1, 
participants’ perceptions of the group interaction 
in Study 2 were primarily in the categories of 
active task contributions and negative socio-
emotional interactions. However, there was some 
evidence that these effects might be tempered 
by the composition of the group.
It is interesting to note how the naïve theories 
of our participants sometimes paralleled and 
sometimes differed from what might be expected 
from theories about mood in individuals. For 
example, negative mood groups were expected to 
engage in more active task behaviors (Study 1), 
and such behaviors were often seen by observers 
of such groups (Study 2). This parallels the 
increased systematic or effortful processing 
that often results from negative moods among 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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individuals (Forgas, 1995). In contrast, people’s 
theories also suggested that positive group moods 
would also increase active task behaviors. It is 
possible that both positive and negative moods 
can increase task contributions at the group 
level, but via different mechanisms. For example, 
negative moods may increase task contributions 
through more effortful information processing, 
whereas positive moods may increase task 
contributions through the establishment of more 
egalitarian norms for task contributions, which 
might develop from greater group cohesion. 
Group mood was also expected to affect agree-
ments and disagreements in Study 1, which is 
consistent with this possibility. As we argued 
previously, agreements and disagreements may 
actually serve both task and relational functions, 
depending on the type of group and the group’s 
mood (Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990).
It is also interesting to note that participants 
in Study 1 expected positive and negative moods 
to have both positive and negative effects. 
Although participants tended to list more positive 
effects of positive moods and negative effects of 
negative moods, they also listed some negative 
effects of positive moods and positive effects of 
negative moods. In sports teams, for example, 
many participants believed that negative moods 
could produce more positive socio-emotional 
interaction. 
Participants’ ratings of the ideal group mood 
in Study 1 provide further evidence that naïve 
theories about group mood are complex and 
vary across types of groups. Although participants 
tended to believe that positive moods were good 
for all groups, there was variability across group 
types in the degree of positivity thought to be 
desirable. In particular, the ideal mood for 
decision-making groups was more neutral than 
that for other group types. Maybe people believe 
that neutral moods are more appropriate for 
group tasks that require intensive information 
processing. This possibility is consistent with some 
individual-level research on mood regulation. 
For example, Erber and Erber (1994) found that 
students put themselves in more neutral moods 
before beginning a class, whereas similar mood 
regulation was not found after the class fi nished. 
In a similar vein, Erber, Wegner, and Therriault 
(1996) found that participants regulated their 
mood to be more neutral when they thought that 
they would be completing tasks with a stranger 
rather than alone. 
 Taken together, the results of the two studies 
indicate that a broad theory of group affect will 
probably be more complex than individual-
level theories. In particular, group theories of 
affect will also need to incorporate the effects 
of mood on interpersonal interaction. Because 
such interaction is an important aspect of most 
groups, group moods may well affect inter-
personal interaction in all types of groups, 
but these effects are likely to be stronger for 
relationship-oriented groups. Theories of group 
affect will also need to consider a group’s primary 
function, especially whether the group serves 
predominantly task or social purposes. Finally, 
it is interesting to note that our participants’ 
naïve theories about group mood were much 
more complex and differentiated than current 
research and theory on group affect. 
Strengths and limitations
To our knowledge, this research is the fi rst at-
tempt to explore the content and consequences 
of naïve theories about group mood. We believe 
that such theories can affect both actual group 
members and outside observers, and that naïve 
theories likely refl ect people’s actual experiences 
in groups. We hope that this research is an 
example of how diverse methods are both useful 
and necessary for examining group moods. 
However, we should also note some potential 
limitations of the research. 
First, our participants’ naïve theories may 
not accurately refl ect actual group processes. 
That is, the actual consequences of positive and 
negative moods in various group types may or 
may not match our participants’ expectations 
about these effects. There is clearly a need for 
more research on group mood and interaction. 
At this point, it is simply too early to judge the 
accuracy of naïve theories about such matters. 
But it is interesting to note that people do 
seem to have naïve theories and use them to 
evaluate groups. 
The generalizability of our research fi ndings 
may be limited because we studied only college 
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students from the United States. Although our 
pretest sample reported reasonable levels of 
experience with the groups that we asked them 
about, they may have been less experienced than 
people from other settings. Older participants, 
for example, may have more complex and 
differentiated theories because they have had 
more diverse experiences in groups. Further, 
there may be important differences in the 
content of naïve theories across cultures. People 
from cultures that discourage emotional displays, 
for example, may incorporate more negative 
consequences of moods into their naïve theories. 
Such cultural differences in naïve theories 
may have vital consequences for culturally 
diverse groups. A related issue is whether naïve 
theories about group mood cause particular 
experiences within a group, or are the result 
of particular experiences in groups? Kelly and 
Spoor’s (2006) model suggests a bidirectional 
relationship between these factors, but future 
research should examine this issue. 
We also limited the type of group that people 
thought about when they generated their re-
sponses in Study 1. Although providing specifi c 
examples of groups was necessary to focus the 
participants’ responses, more complex theories 
might have emerged if we had allowed partici-
pants to choose the type of group that they would 
consider. Our pretest data also showed that par-
ticipants had varying levels of experience with 
the types of groups in Study 1; they were most 
experienced with friendship groups and sports 
teams. Thus, it may have been more diffi cult for 
participants to imagine the effects of mood in 
creativity and decision-making groups. Future 
research should also examine how people spon-
taneously interpret an interaction and the 
extent to which information about group mood 
biases perceptions away from these baseline 
perceptions. In both of our studies, participants 
were always given information about the 
group’s affective state. It may be useful in future 
studies to include a control condition in which 
participants are not given information about a 
group’s mood. 
A fi nal limitation is that we were concerned in 
both studies with recollections and observations 
of groups—we did not study how naïve theories 
affected actual behaviors within groups. Although 
this approach is consistent with previous research 
on naïve theories about group performance 
(e.g. Guzzo et al., 1986; Martell & Guzzo, 1991; 
Staw, 1975), there is a clear need to examine 
how and if naïve theories about group mood 
affect group members in actual interactions. 
It is possible that naïve theories have relatively 
small or opposite effects during actual inter-
actions. Indeed, research on affective fore-
casting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005) suggests that 
individuals are often inaccurate when predict-
ing how they will respond to emotional events. 
Despite this limitation, however, we believe that 
the naïve theories of observers may provide clues 
for how actual group members think about and 
respond to affective infl uences in groups. Thus, 
understanding the content of naïve theories may 
enable us to predict group members’ reactions to 
affective infl uences (Wegener & Petty, 1995). 
Implications and future research
Investigations of naïve theories about social phe-
nomena are important for two reasons. First, these 
theories are important sources of hypotheses, 
because they are based on observations of real 
world phenomena. Second, these theories are 
important sources of possible explanations for 
various phenomena, because they often guide 
individual perceptions and behavior.
Given the fi ndings from our research, several 
questions follow. In particular, are these naïve 
theories correct? Do negative moods truly lead to 
greater task focus, primarily in decision-making 
and creativity groups? At the individual level, 
there is ample research suggesting that negative 
mood states lead to more systematic processing 
of information during decision-making tasks 
(Forgas, 1995), and recent research suggests 
that negative moods may also facilitate individual 
creativity under some circumstances (e.g. George 
& Zhou, 2002). At the group level, Forgas’ (1990) 
research suggests that groups in negative moods 
may also engage in more systematic information 
processing, suggesting that groups in such moods 
are more task focused. However, as discussed 
earlier, there is little research examining how 
group affect infl uences information processing 
(Kelly, 2001).
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(2)
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Another major research question is how naïve 
theories about group mood and group process 
interact and affect group performance. Would 
an increased task focus produced by negative 
moods in decision-making groups improve 
their decision-making? Would the increased 
cohesion and cooperation stemming from 
positive moods improve their decision making 
as well, and perhaps more? Recent research 
by Sabin and Gasper (2002) suggests that the 
positive interpersonal consequences of positive 
group moods may help such groups to engage 
in more systematic information processing. In 
evaluating these and other fi ndings, it will be 
important to keep in mind the potential role 
of naïve theories. For example, do these effects 
only occur when group members are relatively 
unaware of their mood? If they become aware, 
then will they attempt to correct for the biasing 
effects of that mood, based on the content of 
their naïve theories (Wegener & Petty, 1995)? 
Similarly, research suggests that effective leaders 
are able to manage and infl uence group mem-
bers’ emotional states (Ashkanasy & Tse, 2000; 
Bass & Avolio, 1994)—it would be interesting 
to examine how naïve theories about the effects 
of moods on groups cause leaders to attempt to 
control other members’ needs, in order to group 
process and performance. Future research might 
fruitfully address all of these issues. 
Note
1. Because proportions are not normally 
distributed, they were transformed using the 
arcsine transformation. In all cases, analyses 
using the arcsine and the raw proportions 
yielded virtually identical results. Therefore, for 
ease of presentation, the analyses using the raw 
proportions are presented.
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